

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2981
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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 TEL AVIV 5951

EXDIS - DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

1. SUMMARY: SINCE RETURNING FROM WASHINGTON I HAVE MET AT LENGTH PRIVATELY WITH BOTH DAYAN AND WEIZMAN TO TRY TO SIZE UP THE CURRENT NEGOTIATING SITUATION AS THEY SEE IT. THE NEGOTIATING STRATEGY WHICH DAYAN PROPOSED IN WASHINGTON HAS WEIZMAN'S SUPPORT, WHICH HE VIEWS AS HAVING RESULTED FROM HIS MEETING WITH SADAT AND GAMASY. SINCE HE SEES NO TRIP FOR HIMSELF BACK TO CAIRO IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, ALTHOUGH HE AND DAYAN REMAIN ESTRANGED HE IS WILLING TO LET DAYAN CARRY THE BALL. DAYAN TOLD ME ON MAY 5 THAT IN ORDER FOR THERE TO BE SERIOUS CABINET CONSIDERATION OF THE TWO QUESTIONS YOU POSED TO HIM IN WASHINGTON, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO OBTAIN PRIOR ANSWERS FROM SADAT ON FOUR POINTS. THE QUESTIONS RELATE TO WHETHER SADAT IS PREPARED TO: (1) ACT AS SURROGATE FOR THE ARAB PARTIES IN WEST BANK/GAZA NEGOTIATIONS IF THE JORDANIANS REFUSE TO COME IN, AND TO CONCLUDE PEACE AGREEMENT COVERING THE WEST BANK, GAZA AND SINAI IF NEGOTIATIONS ARE SUCCESSFUL; (2) DROP INSISTENCE ON TOTAL WITHDRAWAL FROM WEST BANK/GAZA AND ACCEPT "MINOR MODIFICATIONS" LANGUAGE; (3) ACCEPT DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS FOR WEST BANK/GAZA WHICH INCLUDE CONTINUING PRESENCE OF IDF FORCES IN LIMITED AREAS AT STRATEGIC POINTS; (4) ACCEPT THE ASWAN FORMULA IN LIEU OF

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"SELF-DETERMINATION" OR INSISTENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE. DAYAN HAS THE IMPRESSION THAT YOU MIGHT PERSONALLY BE PREPARED TO CLARIFY THESE QUESTIONS WITH SADAT AT AN EARLY MEETING. THAT OBVIOUSLY WOULD BE HIS VERY STRONG PREFERENCE. IF SADAT'S RESPONSES WERE REASONABLY SATISFACTORY, DAYAN THINKS HE HAS A FIGHTING CHANCE OF OBTAINING POSITIVE RESPONSES FROM THE CABINET TO THE

QUESTIONS YOU POSED TO HIM, THEREBY ENABLING HIM TO MOVE PROMPTLY DOWN THE PROCEDURAL TRACK WHICH HE OUTLINED TO YOU IN WASHINGTON.

2. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THESE CONVERSATIONS WITH WEIZMAN AND DAYAN AND OUR WASHINGTON TALKS, I AM NOW CONVINCED THAT THIS WOULD BE THE WRONG TIME TO PRESENT THE EGYPTIAN COUNTER-PROPOSAL TO THE ISRAELIS, EVEN IF BY GOING BACK TO SADAT WE COULD EXTRACT SOME MODERATE IMPROVEMENTS. IT IS SUCH AN EXTREME VERSION OF THE EGYPTIAN POSITION AND SO AT VARIANCE WITH WHAT SADAT HAS PRIVATELY TOLD US AND THE ISRAELIS THAT I FEAR IT MIGHT SET OFF A CHAIN OF EVENTS HERE WHICH COULD IRREPARABLY DAMAGE THE WHOLE PEACE PROCESS. THE CABINET DEBATE AND SUBSEQUENT PUBLIC DISCUSSION WOULD PLAY DIRECTLY INTO THE HANDS OF BEGIN'S HARDLINE SUPPORTERS WHO CONSTANTLY ARE SEEKING EVIDENCE OF SADAT'S UNTRUSTWORTHINESS AND INFLEXIBILITY. MUCH OF THE GROUND WE HAVE GAINED IN RECENT WEEKS HERE WOULD PROMPTLY BE LOST IN THE VERBAL BACKWASH.

3. MY RECOMMENDATION IS THAT YOU ASK HERMAN TO SEE SADAT AND TRY TO SMOKE OUT THE ANSWERS TO DAYAN'S FOUR QUESTIONS. OF COURSE, IT WOULD BE BETTER IF YOU COULD SEE SADAT YOURSELF. IN ADDITION, I SUGGEST THAT I MEET WITH BEGIN SHORTLY AFTER HIS RETURN TO DAMP DOWN HIS EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE EGYPTIAN COUNTER-PROPOSAL. I PROPOSE TO TELL HIM
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THAT WE ARE SEEKING ANSWERS TO THE POINTS DAYAN HAS PROPOSED AND THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAVE DECIDED TO REFLECT FURTHER ON THEIR DRAFT BEFORE GIVING IT TO US. I WOULD STRESS THAT A FORMAL EGYPTIAN COUNTER-PROPOSAL WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE PUT FORWARD AT SOME FUTURE POINT, BUT FOR THE TIME BEING WE BELIEVE THERE IS MERIT IN PURSUING THE ALTERNATE PROCEDURAL TRACK SUGGESTED BOTH BY DAYAN TO US AND APPARENTLY TO BARAK AND WEIZMAN BY GAMASY AND SADAT. I BELIEVE THAT BY SPEAKING THIS WAY TO BEGIN I CAN FOCUS HIS ATTENTION ON THE NEED FOR POSITIVE RESPONSES TO OUR TWO QUESTIONS AND FACILITATE MOVING THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD IN THE WAY DAYAN HAS SUGGESTED. END SUMMARY

4. SINCE RETURNING FROM WASHINGTON TUESDAY NIGHT I HAVE MET AT LENGTH PRIVATELY WITH BOTH DAYAN AND WEIZMAN TO TRY TO SIZE UP THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION AS THEY SEE IT IN THE WAKE OF BEGIN'S AND DAYAN'S WASHINGTON MEETINGS. THIS MESSAGE SUMS UP THEIR PRESENT VIEWS, AND, MINE, ABOUT NEXT STEPS IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 TEL AVIV 5951

EXDIS - DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

K WEIZMAN'S OVERALL MOOD IS ONE OF PERSONAL FRUSTRATION. ALSO COMPOUNDING IT IS A CONSIDERABLE APPREHENSION ABOUT HIS OWN DELICATE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE CABINET AND IN HIS PARTY AS HE IS INCREASINGLY BEING CHARACTERIZED AS THE "NIAVE ARAB-LOVER". TO COMPOUND HIS GRUSTRATION, HIS RELATIONS WITH BOTH BEGIN AND DAYAN ARE AT BEST "COOL". AS AN EXAMPLE OF THAT COOLNESS, WEIZMAN WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE STRATEGY SESSIONS BETWEEN DAYAN AND BEGIN WHICH PRECEDED DAYAN'S DEPARTURE FOR THE U.S., DESPITE THE FACT THAT, AS HE PUTS IT, "I AM THE ONLY ONE WHO IS TALKING TO SADAT." WEIZMAN IS FULLY INFORMED ABOUT THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS, HAVING READ THE ELABORATELY DETAILED TELEGRAM SUMMARIZING ALL OF THE CONVERSATIONS, WHICH PARENTHETICALLY I UNDERSTAND RUNS SOME FIFTY PAGES IN LENGTH. THE NEGOTIATING STRATEGY WHICH DAYAN PROPOSED IN WASHINGTON HAS WEIZMAN'S SUPPORT; INDEED, HE SEES IT HAVING RESULTED FROM HIS AND BARAK'S LAST MEETINGS WITH SADAT AND GAMASY. HE INSISTS HE IS READY TO STAND ASIDE TO LET DAYAN CARRY THE BALL, WHILE OBVIOUSLY RESENTING GREATLY THE FACT THAT DAYAN TAKES NO INITIATIVE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH HIM, PREFERRING AS ALWAYS TO PLAY A LONE HAND. WEIZMAN HAS HEARD NOTHING RECENTLY

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FROM THE EGYPTIANS VIA HIS OWN CHANNEL. AND HE

SEES NO TRIP FOR HIMSELF BACK TO CAIRO ON THE IMMEDIATE HORIZON, MUCH TO HIS DISAPPOINTMENT. HE WOULD BE READY TO GO IN A MINUTE EITHER WITH DAYAN OR ALONE, BUT THE INTERNAL POLITICAL EQUATION NOW PRECLUDES HIS TAKING THE INITIATIVE TO ASK SADAT TO RECEIVE HIM.

6. WHEN I MET WITH DAYAN ON THE MORNING OF MAY 5, I BEGAN BY ASKING HIS ESTIMATE ABOUT THE LIKELY CABINET RESPONSE TO THE TWO QUESTIONS YOU HAD POSED TO DAYAN IN WASHINGTON. MAKING CLEAR SOMEWHAT POINTEDLY THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE WHOLE SITUATION WITH YADIN AND THAT THEY WERE IN AGREEMENT, DAYAN SAID THAT IN ORDER TO HAVE A SERIOUS CABINET CONSIDERATION OF OUR QUESTIONS IT WAS ESSENTIAL FIRST TO OBTAIN ANSWERS FROM SADAT ON FOUR POINTS. HE ANTICIPATED VERY GREAT DIFFICULTY WITH BEGIN AND WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CABINET IN ATTEMPTING TO GET CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSES FOR US, AND HE MADE VERY CLEAR THAT NEITHER HE NOR YADIN WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO SERIOUSLY INTO THE LISTS ON THESE VERY DIFFICULT ISSUES UNLESS THEY COULD BE ASSURED OF SADAT'S POSITION BEFORE ENTERING THE LION'S DEN. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE CLEARER STATEMENT FROM SADAT THROUGH US, DAYAN HIMSELF WOULD NOT ADVOCATE CONCRETE ANSWERS TO OUR QUESTIONS, NOR WOULD HE ANTICIPATE THAT THERE WOULD BE A REAL CABINET DEBATE OVER SUCH FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES.

7. DAYAN LISTED THE POINTS ON WHICH THE GOI NEEDS MORE ASSURANCE FROM SADAT AS FOLLOWS: (A) (AND OBVIOUSLY MOST IMPORTANT) WHETHER SADAT PERSONALLY IS IN FACT READY TO ACT ON BEHALF OF THE ARAB PARTIES IN NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IF JORDAN CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO COME TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, AND TO CONCLUDE PEACE
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AGREEMENTS COVERING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AS WELL AS SINAI IF THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE SUCCESSFUL. (B) WHETHER SADAT INDEED WILL NOT INSIST ON TOTAL WITHDRAWAL IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA BUT WOULD BE PREPARED FOR AT LEAST "MINOR MODIFICATIONS" TO THE NEGOTIATED WITH RESPECT TO THE BORDERS. (DAYAN DID USE THE PHRASE "MINOR MODIFICATIONS", ALTHOUGH I AM NOT CERTAIN AT ALL THAT IT REPRESENTED A CAREFUL FORMULATION ON THIS POINT.) (C) WHETHER SADAT IS INDEED PREPARED TO SEE DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS WORKED OUT FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WHICH INVOLVE THE CONTINUING PRESENCE OF ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES IN LIMITED AREAS AT STRATEGIC POINTS. (D) WHETHER SADAT INDEED WOULD ACCEPT THE "ASWAN FORMULA" IN LIEU OF INSISTENCE ON "SELF-DETERMINATION" OR AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE.

8. AS ROY ATHERTON COMMENTED TO YOU IN AN ASIDE DURING

THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS, I GATHER THAT WE COULD WITH SOME DEGREE OF ASSURANCE NOW SAY TO THE ISRAELIS THAT AT LEAST POINTS (B), (C) AND (D) DO REFLECT ACCURATELY SADAT'S PRIVATE POSITIONS, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE POSITIONS HE HAS EXPRESSED AS THINGS HE COULD LIVE WITH IF PROPOSED BY THE U.S., NOT POSITIONS HE COULD READILY ADVOCATE HIMSELF. THE REAL AMBIGUITY REVOLVES AROUND QUESTION (A), WHICH DAYAN HAS BEEN POSING REPEATEDLY TO US FOR THE LAST EIGHT MONTHS. NOW THAT WE HAVE HEARD MUCH MORE OF THE STORY OF THE WEIZMAN/BARAK MEETINGS WITH SADAT IN LATE MARCH, WE UNDERSTAND BETTER THE NATURE OF THE ISRAELI HESITATION ABOUT SADAT'S INTENTIONS. AS THE END OF THE THURSDAY MEETINGS WITH SADAT AND GAMASY, BOTH WEIZMAN AND BARAK WERE CONVINCED THAT SADAT'S ANSWERS TO ALL OF THESE QUESTIONS, INCLUDING SPECIFICALLY QUESTION (A), WERE POSITIVE. HOWEVER, DURING THE FRIDAY MORNING MEETING AFTER THE ALLEGED INFLUENCE OF THE MYTHICAL GAZANS HAD BEEN APPLIED, SADAT SEEMS TO HAVE LEFT A GOOD DEAL OF AMBIGUITY IN THE MINDS OF HIS ISRAELI LISTENERS AS TO WHETHER HE WAS REPUDIATING EVERYTHING HE HAD SAID BEFORE

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OR ONLY PORTIONS. ROY ATHERTON'S REPORT TO DAYAN WITH RESPECT TO QUESTION (A) ENCOURAGED HIM, BUT WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY DEFINITIVE TO RESOLVE THE DOUBTS HERE.

9. DAYAN GOT AN IMPRESSION FROM A BRIEF CONVERSATION WITH YOU AT THE AIRPORT ON DEPARTURE THAT YOU MIGHT PERSONALLY BE PREPARED TO CLARIFY THESE QUESTIONS WITH SADAT AT AN EARLY MEETING. THAT OBVIOUSLY WOULD BE HIS VERY STRONG PREFERENCE. IF THIS WERE NOT POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, CLARIFICATION OBTAINED THROUGH HERMAN EILTS OR ROY ATHERTON WOULD BE OBVIOUS ALTERNATIVES.

10. DAYAN GAVE EVERY INDICATION THAT IF WE COULD OBTAIN BEFORE THEIR CABINET MEETING ON THE 21ST OF MAY FURTHER SATISFACTORY CLARIFICATIONS ON THESE FOUR QUESTIONS FOR HIM, THEN HE WOULD HAVE A FIGHTING CHANCE OF GETTING POSITIVE RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONS YOU POSED TO HIM. IF NOT, IT LOOKS AS IF THE RESPONSES TO US WILL BE UNHELPFUL. IF SADAT'S RESPONSES WERE REASONABLY SATISFACTORY, AND THE ISRAELI ANSWERS TO OUR QUESTIONS WERE POSITIVE AS WELL, THEN DAYAN WOULD HOPE TO MOVE PROMPTLY DOWN THE PROCEDURAL TRACK WHICH HE OUTLINED TO YOU DURING THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS. HE ASSUMES FROM YOUR COMMENTS THAT YOU WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE IN THAT CIRCUMSTANCE TO GET SADAT TO INVITE HIM, AND PERHAPS WEIZMAN, TO COME TO EGYPT QUIETLY TO INITIATE THE DETAILED EFFORTS TO HAMMER OUT A "WORKING PAPER" OF DETAILED GUIDELINES FOR A WEST BANK/GAZA SETTLEMENT.

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 TEL AVIV 5951

EXDIS - DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

11. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THESE CONVERSATIONS WITH WEIZMAN AND DAYAN, I HAVE BEEN TRYING TO THINK THROUGH WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT THE DETAILED EGYPTIAN COUNTER-PROPOSAL TO THE BEGIN SELF-RULE PLAN. BEGIN WAS EXCITED TO HEAR THAT HE WAS SOON TO RECEIVE A FORMAL COUNTER-PROPOSAL AND HAS REFERRED TO IT PUBLICLY AS ONE OF THE MAJOR POSITIVE ELEMENTS HE LEARNED ABOUT IN WASHINGTON. NONETHELESS, I AM NOW COMPLETELY CONVINCED THAT THIS WOULD BE THE WRONG TIME TO PRESENT THE EGYPTIAN COUNTER PROPOSAL TO THE GOI. THE TEXT IS SUCH AN EXTREME VERSION OF THE EGYPTIAN POSITION, AND SO AT VARIANCE WITH SOME OF THE ELEMENTS OF SADAT'S ULTIMATE POSITION AS HE HAS CONVEYED THEM IN PRIVATE BOTH TO THE ISRAELIS AND TO US, THAT TO PUT THE TEXT OF THAT PROPOSAL BEFORE THE ISRAELI CABINET WOULD SET OFF A CHAIN OF EVENTS WHICH WOULD PERHAPS IRREPARABLY DAMAGE THE WHOLE PEACE PROCESS. THIS WOULD BE TRUE, I BELIEVE, EVEN IF THE PROPOSAL WERE marginally IMPROVED AS A RESULT OF ANOTHER APPEAL TO SADAT. DAYAN UNDERSTANDS, AS DO WE, THAT ANY FORMAL PROPOSAL FROM THE EGYPTIANS CONCERNING THE WEST BANK MUST BE EXTREME AND WHOLLY UNACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL IF IT IS TO MEET SADAT'S OWN POLITICAL NEEDS WITH THE ARABS, SINCE HE WILL INEVITABLY ASSUME, CORRECTLY,

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THAT IT WOULD LEAK. IF ANY DOCUMENT LIKE THE ONE WE PRESENTLY HAVE WERE GIVEN TO THE ISRAELIS, THE CABINET WOULD UNFORTUNATELY CONSIDER IT AS THE REAL ANSWER TO DAYAN'S QUESTIONS. HAVING HEARD SOMEWHAT ENCOURAGING REPORTS FROM WEIZMAN ABOUT SADAT'S VIEWS DURING THE MARCH TRIP, DESPITE HIS CHANGE OF POSITON AT THE SECOND MEETING, THE CABINET WOULD REACT IN A STATE OF SHOCK TO THE EGYPTIAN COUNTER-PROPOSAL AS DRAFTED BY KAMEL. THE DEBATE IN THE CABINET WOULD TURN IMMEDIATELY TO SADAT'S ALLEGED "UNTRUSTWORTHINESS", TO HIS "INFLEXIBILITY", AND COMPLETELY AWAY FROM THE NEED TO RESPOND CONSTRUCTIVELY TO THE TWO QUESTIONS YOU POSED TO DAYAN. MOREOVER, THE CREDIBILITY OF WEIZMAN'S ARGUMENTS WITH HIS COLLEAGUES THAT SADAT DOES INDEED WANT PEACE AND IS SOMEONE WITH WHOM ISRAEL CAN NEGOTIATE WOULD BE BADLY DAMAGED, AS WOULD SIMILAR ARGUMENTS BEING MADE INCREASINGLY BY YADIN AND HIS DMC COLLEAGUES AND THE LIBERALS. THE CABINET MIGHT WELL MISINTERPRET THIS PROPOSAL AS SIGNALLING A DECISION BY SADAT TO CALL OFF HIS INITIATIVE AND GET HIS CREDENTIALS IN ORDER PRIOR TO REJOINING THE ARAB CONSENSUS. BEGIN WOULD BOTH BE LIKELY TO HARDEN HIS POSITION VIS-A-VIS OUR QUESTIONS, BUT WOULD ALSO BE GIVEN A STRONG SET OF ARGUMENTS TO USE AGAINST ALL THOSE WHO ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT HIS PRESENT STRATEGY. ALL THESE THINGS CONSIDERED, I THINK IT IS WHOLLY UNTIMELY EITHER TO GO BACK TO SADAT AND ASK HIM TO IMPROVE THIS COUNTER-PROPOSAL OR IN ANY WAY TO PROVIDE IT TO THE ISRAELIS AT THIS JUNCTURE.

12. BUT HOW DO WE EXPLAIN TO BEGIN WHAT HAPPENED TO THE EGYPTIAN COUNTER-PROPOSAL? AND WHAT DO WE SAY TO SADAT?

13. MY RECOMMENDATION IS THAT YOU ASK HERMAN EILTS TO SEE SADAT IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS AND TO TRY TO SMOKE OUT, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, THE ANSWERS TO DAYAN'S FOUR QUESTIONS.

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IF YOU COULD SEE SADAT YOURSELF THAT WOULD BE BEST; YOUR SCHEDULE MAY OF COURSE MAKE THAT IMPOSSIBLE. IN ANY CASE, I HOPE THAT WE AILL TRY AS HARS AS POSSIBLE TO CONVINCE SADAT TO BE FORTHCOMING WITH REGARD TO DAYAN'S QUESTIONS, AND TO POSTPONE FOR THE TIME BEING ANY IDEA OF SUBMITTING HIS WEST BANK/GAZA COUNTER-PROPOSAL TO THE ISRAELIS. SINCE PORDUCING THE EGYPTIAN COUNTER-PROPOSAL TO THE BEGIN PLAN HAS BEEN AT U.S. INSISTENCE RATHER THAN HIS OWN DOING, I SUPPOSE HE WILL NOT BE DIFFICULT TO CONVINCE THAT THIS IS NOT THE MOMENT TO GIVE THAT PROPOSAL TO THE ISRAELIS. BUT I AM SURE HE WILL WANT TO CONTINUE TO HIDE HIS ULTIMATE POSITION, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO QUESTION (A), IN A CLOUD OF SOME AMBIGUITY.

I CAN ONLY SAY THAT I AM CONVINCED THIS IS THE MOMENT FOR HIM TO BE LESS AMBIGUOUS.

14. I FURTHER RECOMMEND THAT I BE AUTHORIZED TO SEE BEGIN NEXT WEEK, SHORTLY AFTER HIS RETURN, TO CURTAIL QUICKLY HIS EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE EGYPTIAN COUNTER-PROPOSAL. I BELIEVE I SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO TELL HIM THAT YOU ARE SEEKING ANSWERS FOR HIM AND DAYAN TO THE POINTS DAYAN HAS POSED, AND THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAVE DECIDED TO REFLECT FURTHER ON THEIR DRAFT BEFORE GIVING IT TO US AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON AND THE QUESTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN PUT TO THEM. I COULD SAY THAT A FORMAL EGYPTIAN COUNTER-PROPOSAL WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE PUT FORWARD AT SOME FUTURE POINT, BUT THAT WE HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE ALTERNATE PROCEDURAL TRACK SUGGESTED BOTH BY DAYAN TO US, AND APPARENTLY ALSO TO BARAK AND WEIZMAN BY GAMASY AND SADAT. FOR THE TIME BEING, THEREFORE, WE THINK WE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO TRY TO PUSH NEGOTIATIONS INTO THAT TRACK RATHER THAN SEEK TO RECONVENE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF A WRITTEN EGYPTIAN COUNTER-PROPOSAL ABOUT THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. BY SPEAKING THIS WAY TO BEGIN, I CAN ALSO HELP TO FOCUS HIS ATTENTION ON THE NEED FOR POSITIVE RESPONSES TO YOUR SECRET

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TWO QUESTIONS IF WE ARE TO BE ABLE TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD IN THE WAY DAYAN HAS SUGGESTED.

15. I CANNOT PROMISE THAT PROCEEDING IN THIS MANNER WILL PRODUCE THE RIGHT RESULT, EITHER IN CAIRO OR IN JERUSALEM. BUT I AM CERTAIN THAT OTHER POSSIBLE APPROACHES ARE LIKELY TO PRODUCE A RAPID FREEZING OF THE ICE HERE, AND WILL MOVE US ONLY FURTHER AWAY FROM A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

16. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO REPEAT HIS MESSAGE TO AMMAN. LEWIS

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